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Indigenous Self-government?
An Assessment of the Nisga’a
Treaty Agreement
JACOB WEBSTER

O

ver the course of Canadian history,
Indigenous peoples have endured a
difficult relationship with the state.
This relationship is indicative of the
history of colonialism in Canada and continues be
problematic in contemporary interactions between
Canadian First Nations and the federal and provincial
governments. The question of how Indigenous peoples
fit into the Canadian federal system is a complex one
whose answer depends largely on the specific contextual
situation of each First Nations group. In this essay, I
argue that the Nisga’a Treaty1 agreement exemplifies a
commendable attempt at Indigenous self-government,
which is consistent with the principles evoked in the
Charlottetown Accord2 and in the scholarship on
Indigenous self-government. In this way, the Nisga’a
treaty sets up a model for Indigenous self-government
that does not require constitutional change and is thus

Signed on 27 May 1998, the Nisga’a Treaty was negotiated and
signed by the Nisga’a nation, the Province of British Columbia and
the Government of Canada, ostensibly to settle outstanding land
claims. It went into effect on 11 May 2000.
1

The Charlottetown Accord was a package of proposed
amendments to the Canadian Constitution that were considered
by the provinces of Canada and the Canadian federal government
in 1992, but was ultimately rejected. Among the reforms was a
proposal to enshrine an Aboriginal right to self-government in the
Constitution.
2
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possible in the current constitutional context. The
Nisga’a Treaty has withstood two judicial challenges
and was informed by current constitutional principles
(Aldridge and Fenge, 2015, 149). Because of its
affirmed constitutionality, the Nisga’a Treaty provides
a way forward within the current federal framework
and provides a replicable example for First Nations. In
order to argue that the Nisga’a Treaty creates a model
for Indigenous self-government that is consistent with
the theoretical ideals of Indigenous self-government, I
first outline the principles evoked by the Charlottetown
Accord and by scholars in the field of Indigenous selfgovernment. I then summarize the text of the Nisga’a
agreement, identifying relevant sections that coincide
or potentially conflict with the theoretical principles
proposed in the first section. In order to conduct a more
fulsome examination of the Nisga’a agreement, I also
examine recent studies that endeavor to evaluate the
success of the Nisga’a agreement based on its practical
implementation in the community, not simply on the
text of the agreement. By examining the text and the
practical implementation of the agreement, I argue that
the Nisga’a treaty agreement provides the framework for
Indigenous self-government in a way that is consistent
with the theoretical principles identified by the
Charlottetown Accord and certain scholars. The Nisga’a
treaty is a sound implementation of Indigenous selfgovernment that is possible without any constitutional
change.
Theoretical Principles
In identifying the opinions of scholars on the principles
of Indigenous self-government, it is necessary to
identify the vein in the literature that proposes that
negotiations between settler government and native
peoples are inherently colonial. This method of thinking
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provides little room for negotiation or compromise, but
identifying this viewpoint is important. Paul Rynard’s
work is emblematic of this critique of settler-Indigenous
relations. Rynard generally disapproves of the Nisga’a
agreement arguing that it does not represent a break
from the past in the sense that it follows the same
colonial channels of settler-Indigenous relations (2000).
Furthermore, Rynard argues that the land negotiations
between the Nisga’a and the state perpetuate a legal
relationship of dependence of First Nations on the state
that is inherently colonial (Rynard, 2000 p.240). While
this critique is important and should be identified,
it is not emblematic of other larger themes within
the literature and precludes any state-First Nations
agreement to help install self-government within the
current constitutional structure. Rynard’s principles are
valuable but are largely unrealistic given the unlikelihood
of broad constitutional change.
While Rynard’s critique and principles are
unrealistic given the current constitutional regime,
the Charlottetown Accord and the work of other
scholars present their own frameworks that are more
practically suitable for an assessment of the Nisga’a treaty
agreement.
While the Charlottetown Accord failed in a
national referendum in 1992, it nonetheless identified
guiding principles for what its authors proposed as a
“third order” of government. The Accord states that
the Indigenous peoples of Canada, due to their status
as the first peoples of Canada, have a right to govern
their land and to promote their languages, cultures
and traditions (Charlottetown Accord, 1985, S.2(b)).
It further identifies their right to govern their own
economies, identities and institutions (Charlottetown
Accord, 1985, p.A s.4). It also states that the provincial
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and federal governments have a duty to negotiate
with Indigenous peoples on issues of jurisdiction and
on the use of resources and assets on Native lands
(Charlottetown Accord, 1985, p.B s.45). Finally, it states
that the financing of these self-government agreements
should be negotiated in a way that promotes equal
opportunity and furthers social, economic, and cultural
development (Charlottetown Accord, 1985, p. B s.50).
The Charlottetown Accord, despite its failure, identified
certain key policy areas, notably culture, identity, and
institutions that should frame any assessment of an
Indigenous self-government regime.
Scholarship on Indigenous self-government
further clarifies the vision set forth in the Charlottetown
Accord. Dan Russell identifies the Penner Report3 as
the impetus for self-government and the importance
of its recommendations for “expanded jurisdiction of
first nations governments, the exclusion of provincial
jurisdiction from Indigenous lands, and a process of First
Nations accountability to Indigenous people” (2000,
7). Furthermore, he argues that if self-government has
any content at all it must mean the ability to enact
laws concerning crime, health care, and education all
enforceable by Indigenous courts (Russell, 2000, 11).
In this argument, Russell asserts that First Nations
governments must have their own judicial enforcement
mechanisms to execute their own legislation.

In 1983, a Special Parliamentary Committee on Indian Selfgovernment released The Penner Report, named after its chairman,
Keith Penner, a Liberal Member of Parliament for CochraneSuperior. The Report recommended that Canada’s Indian Act
and the Department of Indian Affairs be phased out gradually
and replaced by local governments established by Native peoples
themselves.

3
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Wayne Warry takes a different approach to
Indigenous self-government, proposing that it should
be up to the First Nations groups to determine the
legitimate parameters of self-government (1998, 36).
He argues that self-government is an iterative process
in which its meaning becomes clearer through its
implementation and practice (1998, 49). Warry’s
approach differs greatly from Russell’s and he seeks to
grant agency to Indigenous peoples in their specific
contexts to determine what their legitimate form of selfgovernment will mean given the needs of their individual
communities. Warry does not provide criteria in the
way Russell does, but nonetheless helps inform what
Indigenous self-government would look like in saying
that it recognizes the right and ability of individuals and
communities to conduct their own affairs (1998, 50).

on the ground. The guiding principle identified in
all the sources is Indigenous control over Indigenous
affairs, and a distancing from the federal and provincial
governments from business that is internal to First
Nations communities. More specifically, self-government
agreements ought to include provisions for Indigenous
control over language, culture, economy, identity,
institutions, traditions, and land. Furthermore, as
Russell asserts, these agreements ought to include
enforcement mechanisms, whether they be courts or
other institutions, to enforce laws made by Indigenous
governments. After outlining his principles, Russell
asserts that the real question is not what Indigenous selfgovernment ought to look like, but “can it be done?”
(2000, 89). By examining the Nisga’a Treaty, I argue that
Russell’s question can be answered in the affirmative.

Tim Schouls provides further clarity to the
question of what Indigenous self-government will and
ought to mean on the ground. Firstly, he states that selfgovernment should be principally to preserve Indigenous
culture (Schouls, 2003, 45). While cultural preservation
should be the chief concern of any self-government
regime, Schouls clarifies by stating, “Self government is
understood to be fundamentally about the expression
of an Indigenous desire for control over internal affairs”
(2003, 178). This is an important stipulation in Schouls’
statement as it implies a degree of autonomy from the
Canadian state that extends the tribe’s authority only
to members of the tribe and to matters that are internal
to their own community. In this, Schouls argues for a
degree of separation between Indigenous communities
and the Canadian state.

The Nisga’a Treaty Agreement

Viewed together, the Charlottetown Accord
and the scholarly literature on the topic help clarify
what Indigenous self-government should look like
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The Nisga’a Treaty agreement is the first modernday treaty in British Columbia and in this it is novel
(Cassidy, 2004, 5). Given its novelty, it is imperative
to adjudicate the success of this paradigm based on the
theoretical principles identified in the preceding section.
In adjudicating the success of the agreement, I break
up my analysis into criteria identified in the literature
on self-government. The eight categories provided in
the literature to judge the success of the Nisga’a Treaty
are: general provisions, government structure, social
services, the judiciary, language and culture, lands and
assets, citizenship, and financing. By identifying how the
treaty addresses Nisga’a government on these issues and
adjudicating them based on the criteria established by
the relevant literature, it is possible to ascertain the value
of the Nisga’a agreement. Any study of the Nisga’a treaty
that ignores the actual text of the agreement would be
incomplete. Based largely on the text of the agreement,
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in this section I assess how well it fits with the criteria
established in the Charlottetown Accord and the relevant
scholarship.
Chapter two of the Nisga’a agreement sets out
certain general conditions that help frame it. Firstly, the
agreement does not alter the Constitution of Canada
and exists within the meaning of Sections 25 and 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982 (Canada et. al. ch.2 s.1). The
Charter will still apply to Nisga’a governments, bearing
in mind “the free and democratic nature of Nisga’a
Government” (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.2 s.9). Finally,
while federal and provincial laws will still apply to the
Nisga’a, in the event of a conflict between these laws and
the agreement, the agreement will prevail (Canada et. al.,
1999, ch.2 s.13). These principles set the groundwork
for the rest of the agreement and support the supremacy
of the self-government agreement over any piece of
provincial or federal legislation.
One key principle identified in the literature
is that Indigenous governments ought to have control
over their institutions and governmental structures.
The agreement addresses this. The Nisga’a have the
jurisdiction to make laws concerning the establishment
of Nisga’a institutions (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11, s.
34). This includes the composition of their government,
its financial administration, and the conduct of
elections and referenda. The provisions for the Nisga’a
constitution enumerated in Chapter 11, Section Nine
are relatively vague, allowing for Nisga’a autonomy in
these areas. For example, while it mandates that the
Nisga’a provide a mechanism for challenging Nisga’a
laws it does not codify what this mechanism should
look like or establish a settler standard to which it
should conform (Canada et al.). In this way, it sets up
guiding principles but leaves the practical administration
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of these issues up to the Nisga’a and their members.
This method of structuring the Nisga’a government
allows for a relatively high degree of Nisga’a autonomy,
which is consistent with notions in the literature of
self-government as a process that must be determined
by Indigenous communities themselves. Furthermore,
the Nisga’a right to self-government is constitutionally
entrenched through this treaty, which means that
it cannot be ignored by the province or the federal
government (Cassidy, 2004, 8). The structure of the
Nisga’a government in general conforms to the standards
evoked by the literature by recognizing self-government
as an iterative process that is valuable to the extent that
First Nations groups have the autonomy to determine
their own internal constitutional structures.
The way the Nisga’a agreement addresses social
services provides an illustrative criterion by which
to judge the degree to which the agreement is selfgovernment. Generally speaking, the Nisga’a can make
laws creating social services (Canada et. al, 1999, ch. 11
s. 78). More specifically, the province and the federal
government have a responsibility to negotiate with the
Nisga’a on the administration and delivery of federal
and provincial social services by the Nisga’a themselves
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s.78). This provision is
integral to the meaning of self-government because it
provides Nisga’a control over aspects of government
that are central to the well-being of Nisga’a members.
Furthermore, the agreement specifically addresses health
care, stating that the Nisga’a and the governments
will negotiate to reach agreement for health care for
individuals on the reserve, and in the instance that any
Nisga’a law regarding the structure or organization of
health services on Nisga’a lands contravenes federal or
provincial law, Nisga’a law will prevail (Canada et. al.,
1999, ch.11 s.84). Furthermore, the Nisga’a have the
9 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018

ability to regulate Indigenous healers on the reserve,
however they cannot regulate substances that are already
regulated by the federal or provincial governments
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 86). This provision is
mixed in terms of the degree to which it allows selfgovernment. Similarly mixed are the ways the agreement
provides for education on reserve. While the Nisga’a can
make laws regarding preschool to grade-12 education,
which includes the teaching of Nisga’a language and
culture, there are standards set forth by the province
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 100). Not only must
the Nisga’a education system prepare its graduates
to competently attend post-secondary education, it
must also permit the transfer of students to provincial
schools at each grade level (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.
11 s. 100). These provisions provide checks along the
way on Nisga’a education that reduce the ability of the
Nisga’a to innovate. But generally, Nisga’a language
and culture can be taught concurrently with provincial
standards provided students in each grade can achieve
at similar levels to students at provincially operated
schools. The vernacular surrounding the standards
by which the Nisga’a must conform to the province’s
regulation is very important in determining the
degree of Nisga’a autonomy. In terms of Nisga’a postsecondary institutions, the Treaty calls only for standards
“comparable” to those of the province on issues of
organization, admissions, instructor qualifications,
and curriculum (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s. 104).
Since Nisga’a standards need only be comparable to the
province’s, there is a degree of autonomy in this domain.
Overall, the provisions for social services in the Nisga’a
agreement are generally amenable to the principles
identified in the literature and provide for a system that
gives the Nisga’a a relatively high degree of autonomy in
regulating health services and education.
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As Russell argues, Indigenous law enforcement
is required for any Indigenous self-government regime
to be legitimate (2000, 11). The Nisga’a treaty fulfils this
requirement to a certain extent but falls down in certain
key areas. The Nisga’a have the jurisdiction to make laws
regulating or controlling actions on their land other
than actions that are authorized by the Crown or actions
that may constitute “nuisance, a trespass, a danger to
public health, or a threat to public order, peace, or
safety” (Canada et. al., ch.11 s. 59). The words in this
section are relatively vague, which makes it difficult
to adjudicate this section. Despite this ambiguity, the
Nisga’a do not have the authority to create criminal law
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 61). This is a significant
limit to Nisga’a judicial abilities. Furthermore, the
Nisga’a may not regulate gambling on their lands, which
is another infringement on the theoretical notions of
self-government (Canada et. al, 1999, ch.11 s. 108).
Despite these inadequacies in the treaty, Chapter 12,
which describes the “Administration of Justice,” provides
a clearer framework for Nisga’a judicial mechanisms.
This chapter provides for the Nisga’a to create their own
police force (Canada et. al. 1999, ch. 12 s.4). While the
force must be in “substantial conformity” to provincial
standards in terms of use of force by its officers and
codes of conduct, the treaty provides for a large degree
of autonomy in this area (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.
12 s.4). Furthermore, these police officers have all the
powers and responsibilities of peace officers under the
law (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.12 s.13). There is also a
reciprocal system whereby provincial police officers must
notify the Nisga’a police forces if they are performing
their duties in Nisga’a territory and vice versa (Canada
et. al., 1999, ch. 12 s.14-15). These sections set up a
notion of equality between the two police forces, which
symbolizes the equal status of the Nisga’a and provincial
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

governments. Furthermore, the provisions whereby the
police force must be in substantial conformity with the
provinces provide not so much a limit on police power
as they do protection of citizens’ rights.
Not only can the Nisga’a establish a police
force with a relative degree of autonomy they are also
capable of establishing a system of courts provided they
comply with “generally recognized principles in respect
of judicial fairness, independence and impartiality
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 12 s.33). This section sets
forth criteria that are theoretical and non-specific,
which gives the Nisga’a a large degree of autonomy
in terms of the structure of their judicial system. This
autonomy affirms the theoretical principles of selfgovernment. Furthermore, the Nisga’a courts have
powers that are relatively far reaching. They can review
Nisga’a institutions, adjudicate based on Nisga’a law, and
adjudicate disputes within the jurisdiction of provincial
courts provided it is on Nisga’a land and involves Nisga’a
people. While the Nisga’a are unable to make criminal
law and are limited in their legislative ability on certain
other legal issues, the Treaty does set up enforcement
mechanisms that afford the Nisga’a a large degree of
autonomy. While the judicial set-up under the Nisga’a
agreement may not totally fulfil Russell’s criteria, it does
a respectable job in setting up autonomy for Nisga’a
courts and police forces to enforce Nisga’a law in Nisga’a
territory.
The criterion that is mentioned most commonly
in the literature as a litmus test for self-government is
the degree to which the Indigenous governments are
autonomous in matters of culture. On this issue, the
Nisga’a agreement is relatively strong. The agreement
states outright that “Nisga’a language and culture are
matters that should be subject to Nisga’a laws and
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governments, to as great an extent as possible” (Cassidy,
2004, 19). The Nisga’a have the authority to make laws
that promote and preserve their culture and language
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s.41). Specifically, this
clause allows the Nisga’a to pass laws to authorize the
use, reproduction, and representation of Nisga’a cultural
symbols and practices, and the teaching of Nisga’a
language (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s.41). While
this provision is broad and gives the Nisga’a a large
degree of autonomy, it does not allow the Nisga’a to
legislate regarding intellectual property (Canada et. al.,
1999 ch.11 s.42). On this issue, the treaty is potentially
lacking in terms of its protection of Nisga’a culture but
other sections provide the Nisga’a with greater power.
For instance, the Nisga’a can control the devolution
of cultural property for people who die intestate and
Nisga’a governments can make laws forcing employers
to accommodate Nisga’a employees based on aspects of
Nisga’a culture (Canada et al., 1999, ch. 11 s. 115-16).
These provisions give the Nisga’a government control
over cultural materials and give Nisga’a residents a
greater ability to practice their culture. Chapter 17 sets
out the procedures by which the Nisga’a can reclaim
Nisga’a artifacts from the Canadian Museum of History
and the Royal British Columbia Museum. Chapter nine
also sets out provisions for the traditional Nisga’a harvest
of wildlife in the Nass Wildlife Reserve subject only to
provincial legislation for public health and conservation
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 17 s.1). This provision does
not require the Nisga’a to obtain hunting licenses
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 17 s.10). These provisions
allow for the reclamation of cultural artifacts and the
practice of traditional Nisga’a hunting rituals that allow
the Nisga’a to regulate their own traditional cultural
practices. While the agreement does not delegate the
ability to legislate based on state intellectual property
11 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018

laws, it does delegate autonomy in other important areas
and extends the Nisga’a ability to control and practice
their culture.
Like cultural considerations, issues concerning
land assets are frequently mentioned by scholars
identifying criteria by which to adjudicate Indigenous
self-government. The agreement states that the Nisga’a
can make laws regarding the use and management of
their lands (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s.44). These laws
have a wide jurisdiction under Section 44 and include
the right to control how land is disposed of on Nisga’a
territory (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 S. 44,d). They have
the ability to regulate business on their land and can
zone, plan, and develop their land as they see fit (Canada
et. al., 1999, ch.11 s.47). Furthermore, the same criteria
for bird harvest in Chapter nine are made in Chapter
eight for fish harvest. The Nisga’a have the right to fish
on their lands subject only to provincial legislation on
public health and conservation and do not require a
government license (Canada et. al., 1999 , ch. 8 s.1, s.7).
Generally speaking, the Nisga’a treaty allows for a large
degree of autonomy in Nisga’a legislation on the use of
Nisga’a land and resources. This is consistent with the
criteria set out by the scholarship identified earlier.
Citizenship—that is, who is Nisga’a and who is
not—is an important part of any Indigenous agreement.
The criteria for citizenship are set forth in Chapter 20
of the agreement and are relatively restrictive. Nisga’a
citizens must be of Nisga’a ancestry either by being
born to a mother in the tribe, a descendant of such an
individual, an adopted child of a woman in the tribe,
or the spouse of one of said people (Canada et. al.,
1999, ch.9 S.1). These criteria are relatively restrictive
because they are based on an ancestral link to the Nisga’a
people. Furthermore, the Nisga’a have the authority
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to form an enrolment committee, one governed by
rules set out by the Nisga’a council that will adjudicate
cases of membership (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.9 s.11).
This effectively allows the Nisga’a to regulate their
membership and thus regulate access to Nisga’a lands
and the privileges of Nisga’a citizenship. This internal
mechanism whereby the Nisga’a can control membership
is integral to a the safeguarding of all other Nisga’a rights
under the agreement. There is an Appeal Board that
adjudicates references from the Enrolment Committee
and the appeals board is composed of Nisga’a and
government officials in equal numbers (Canada et.
al., 1999, s. 19 ch.9). The appeals process privileges
the Nisga’a and allows for the pre-eminence of Nisga’a
decision-making at all levels. It creates a framework of
self-government that encourages Nisga’a autonomy in
the critical area of membership.
While the agreement seems to satisfy notions
of self-government in crucial areas defined by scholars,
issues of financing are paramount to the practical
implementation of this agreement. With regard to
financing, the agreement sets forth a process that is very
fair to the Nisga’a. Chapter 15 describes the financing
agreement and states that every five years the parties
agree to negotiate financing that would enable the
agreed-upon public programs and services to Nisga’a
residents at levels that are reasonably comparable to
those in northwest British Columbia (Canada et. al.,
1999, ch. 15 s.3). This sets a relatively high standard
by which the province and the federal government
must provide financing to the Nisga’a government.
Furthermore, these calculations will take into account
the costs necessary to establish and operate the Nisga’a
government, the effectiveness of public programs, the
location of Nisga’a lands, training requirements, Nisga’a
cultural values, and the obligations of the Nisga’a
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

government (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.15 s.9). This
clause widens the scope of the financing arrangement
taking into account important considerations that help
ensure the ability of the Nisga’a government to operate.
By taking into account the remoteness of Nisga’a
lands and Nisga’a cultural values, the agreement is
sensitive to the Nisga’a situation and helps facilitate selfgovernment. While the Nisga’a have the power to tax
their own citizens (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 16 s.1), the
Nisga’a are also subject to governmental taxes—federal
and provincial (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 16 s.6). The
subjection to governmental taxes is one that contravenes
the Indian Act but does not contravene the jurisdiction
of the Nisga’a government. In this way, while it may
be less than ideal for Nisga’a residents, taxation is not
necessarily an issue that lessens the degree to which the
agreement fulfils the notion of self-government.
Based on the text of the agreement, the Nisga’a
treaty fulfils to a large extent the theoretical principles
identified in the literature on self-government. The
Nisga’a have prevailing jurisdiction in several substantial
areas including government, citizenship, culture,
language, lands and assets, the organization and
structure of health services, child and family services,
and education (Cassidy, 2004, 10). Furthermore, the
agreement clarifies that the Nisga’a have the authority
to make laws that are necessarily incidental to exercising
their authority as set out by the agreement (Canada
et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 126). While occasionally the
agreement stipulates that the state can regulate Nisga’a
government or that the Nisga’a cannot legislate on
certain issues, the agreement largely fulfils the theoretical
principles evoked in the relevant literature. In this
way, the Nisga’a acquire law-making authority in the
crucial areas of “lands, language, culture, education,
health, child protection, traditional healing practices,
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

fisheries, wildlife, forestry, environmental protection,
and policing” (Allen, 2004, 235). While the actual text
of the agreement is consistent with the principles of
Indigenous self-government, the practical reality of how
the agreement is implemented is just as (if not more)
important.
A 2010 study by Joseph Quesnel and Conrad
Winn reports mixed results as to the effect of the
agreement on the quality of governance within the
Nisga’a community. They find that the funding from
the government is sufficient for the operation of Nisga’arun programs and that there is higher trust for the local
Nisga’a government than neighboring bands have for
their own governmental arrangements (Quesnel et.
al., 2011, 9). Despite this seemingly positive feedback,
they find no improvement in public opinion over the
government’s ability to keep promises, though there are
large concerns about nepotism among Nisga’a leadership
(Quesnel et. al., 2011, 11-12). Furthermore, they state
that there is difficulty for many members of the group
to live outside of the Indian Act framework (Quesnel
et. al., 2011, 16). Despite these mixed results, what we
understand as good government and as self-government
should not be conflated. While the immediate results of
the agreement are mixed as to their impact on improving
governance, the agreement provides a workable
framework for Nisga’a self-government, which is an
essentially positive goal. While the short-term effects
of self-government in the Nisga’a community may be
mixed, the creation of a workable regime for Indigenous
self-government within the current constitutional
framework is a notable accomplishment and a step
toward Indigenous self-government on a larger scale
that, as the literature demonstrates, is an essential step in
the advancement of Canadian Indigenous peoples.
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In conclusion, the question of how Indigenous
peoples should rightly interact with the state is one
that has prompted a vast amount of scholarship and
political discussion. The Nisga’a Treaty provides the
framework for an answer to the question of how
Canadian First Nations fit into the federal system. The
Nisga’a agreement does not provide for self-government
on every issue and, in some areas, there are standards
imposed by the provincial and federal governments.
But in most areas, the agreement mostly adheres to the
theoretical ideals proposed in the Charlottetown Accord
and in literature on self-government. While theory is
useful for crafting frameworks, policy that is negotiated
by three “orders” of government is rarely ideal. In this
way, the Nisga’a agreement provides a valuable example
for how Indigenous self-government can be realized
within the current constitutional framework to a degree
that substantially conforms to theoretical ideals. While
the practical implementation of the agreement has had
mixed effects in its improvement of governance for the
Nisga’a, good governance and self-government should
not be conflated, and self-government is a goal unto
itself for Indigenous peoples in Canada. While the
Nisga’a agreement is somewhat exceptional in that it
was instituted in an environment made conducive to
compromise by provincial and federal governments, it
still provides a model for future negotiations (Cassidy,
2004, 24). As Wayne Warry states, “Self-government
is an emergent, iterative process—its meaning and
validity become clearer with its practice” (1998, 49).
In implementing the Nisga’a agreement, Canadian
governments are supporting a forward-looking process
that is consistent with theoretical, ideal principles and
workable in the current constitutional context.
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